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ABSTRACT
Ling, Jie M.S.E.C.E, Purdue University, May 2014. Smart Card Fault Attacks on
Public Key and Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Major Professor: Brian King.
Blo¨mmer, Otto, and Seifert presented a fault attack on elliptic curve scalar mul-
tiplication called the Sign Change Attack, which causes a fault that changes the sign
of the accumulation point. As the use of a sign bit for an extended integer is highly
unlikely, this appears to be a highly selective manipulation of the key stream. In
this thesis we describe two plausible fault attacks on a smart card implementation of
elliptic curve cryptography.
King and Wang designed a new attack called counter fault attack by attacking the
scalar multiple of discrete-log cryptosystem. They then successfully generalize this
approach to a family of attacks. By implementing King and Wang’s scheme on RSA,
we successfully attacked RSA keys for a variety of sizes. Further, we generalized the
attack model to an attack on any implementation that uses NAF and wNAF key.
11. INTRODUCTION
Sandy, an account processor receives a phone call from a women, saying that someone
has being attempted to steal his identity. He inquires to an identity protection service
and asks for his name, date of birth and social security number from Sandy, who is
still not aware that his identity is going to be stolen. A week later, Sandy’s credit
card gets declined at the gas station for the reason of an overdraft on his account.
Someone from Florida is enjoying new jewelry, jet ski and luxury cosmetics from the
replica of Sandy’s credit card. This is the opening scene of the Hollywood movie
“Identity Thief”, which made 174 million dollars box office. The story moves on as
a comedy that the mid-mannered man travels across the country to confront this
harmless looking women who lives on credit card scams. Although the theme of this
film is to tell people life tips, there is a genuine tension about credit card security
throughout.
This film, reminds everyone of the risks for which our convenient consuming ap-
proach has brought to us. Since smart cards came in to our everyday life, they have
become a popular security token, implemented in a number of applications with di-
verse security requirements, e.g, credit cards, bank cards, cellular communications,
electronic cash, banking, satellite TV and Government identifications.
The first smart card fraud, reported in 1995, was the villain tried to register fuel
sales on cloned cards to get rebate. This caused thirty million dollars loss to the
card issuer [21]. In 1999, software engineer Serge Humpinch, announced his attack on
public key system of French Cartes Bancaire. He claimed the success by purchasing
10 Metro tickets from an online system, then asked the bank for 28 million dollars
for his scheme. This man was arrested immediately for blackmail [7].
Though such examples appear dated, the threat today is very real. Furthermore,
recent advances in attack scenarios bring greater threats. In 1996, Kocher from MIT
2brought timing attack to the world, which pioneered the later generated power mon-
itoring attack, electromagnetic attack, etc. His work lays the foundation of many
powerful side channel attacks. His techniques can efficiently break public key cryp-
tosystems. Thus a new industry was created to protect smart cards, the reason is
that smart cards are embedded in a number of highly sensitive and high-financial
impacted applications.
Smart cards used to be touted as “secure”’ portable devices. In high end appli-
cations, like banking and identification applications, the smart card may be used to
provide a signature and involves a secret signing key. The key placed on the smart
card is usually owned by the card issuer rather than the card possessor, e.g. even if
a hacker processed a million credit cards and technically “dissected” them, the key
would still lay in the bank systems “safely”.
Nevertheless, curiosity about the security of smart cards has not stopped. These
cards could emit two contradictory signals to people: they can be attacked and they
are secure. While the answer is a smart card system has proven to be more reliable
than other machine based cards, such as magnetic stripe and barcode. However
this reliance does not withstand all attempts to break the secret, as smart card is not
impeccable. Various adversarial attacks have been developed in attempts to determine
the secret key. Once the signing key is known to the adversary they can construct
a signature and bypass the necessary procedure, a result in a banking application
could imply unlimited access to the banks financial resources. But how, you will ask.
Actually it is everywhere, and probably you are already targeted.
In this thesis we discuss several smart card “fault attack”. In Chapter 2, we
provide some background information. In Chapter 3 we discuss smart card security
and introduce several fault attacks. In Chapters 4 and 5 we discuss our fault attacks.
32. MATHEMATICS/CRYPTOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND
A field is a nonempty set F with two operations: addition and multiplication such that
F is a commutative additive group and all nonzero elements of F form a commutative
multiplicative group. Further the multiplication distributes over the addition. In a
computational setting, one needs a discrete set, so one typically uses a finite field.
An encryption algorithm is an operation that is used to ensure privacy. The
message to be encrypted is called plaintext. The encrypted message is called the
ciphertext. Encryption will utilize some “encryption key” ke. The encryption must be
reversible. Decryption is the operation that reverses encryption. Decryption will use a
decryption key kd which must be a secret key. We collectively call the encryption and
decryption schemes together with the encryption and decryption keys, a cryptosystem.
A cryptosystem for which it is easy to compute the decryption key given the en-
cryption key is called a symmetric cryptosystem. A cryptosystem for which it is hard
to compute the decryption key given the encryption key is called an asymmetric-key
cryptosystem or public-key cryptosystem. The encryption key is the public-key and
will be denoted by pk, whereas the decryption key must be secret and will be denoted
by sk. Public-key cryptosystems are often based on some type of hard problem like
factoring or discrete log problem. A design of a cryptosystem is useful as long as
the method to break it is infeasible. An easily broken system is not reliable. Many
schemes are based on problems that are computationally “hard”, namely computa-
tional secure problem. For example the problem of factoring large integers is consid-
ered to be computationally “hard”. This thesis concerns public-key cryptography in
the context of its use on smart cards.
4There are a number of functions that are used to increase security, such as MAC
(message authentication codes), signatures and hash functions. A hash function h is
an algorithm to maps data of arbitrary length to data of fixed length w. Moreover,
it needs to possess the following property:
1. h(m) is “efficient to compute”.
2. On any input x the output h(x) should be computationally indistinguishable
from a uniform binary string in the interval [0, 2w).
3. Preimage resistance - for essentially all pre-specified outputs, it is computation-
ally infeasible to find any input which hashes to that output.
4. 2nd-preimage resistance - it is computationally infeasible to find any second
input which has the same output as any specified input.
5. Collision resistance - it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct
inputs x, x′ which hash to the same output.
Hash functions are used in a number of security applications. Common hash
functions include SHA1 [29](which is obsolete), SHA2 [28], RIPEMED, and several
in the MD family [20].
The Secure Hash Algorithm, known as the U.S. Federal Information Processing
Standard (FIPS), is a group of hash functions designed published by the the U.S.
National Security Agency (NSA) and then published by NIST(National Institute of
Standards and Technology). SHA-1 [29] was designed as a hash function with 160-bit
argument, a weakness was found in SHA1 and it is no longer in wide use today. SHA-
2 [28] is believed to be much stronger and includes a significant number of changes
from its predecessor, SHA-1. SHA-2 currently consists of six hash functions with
digests that are 224, 256, 384 or 512 bits.
A digital signature is the cryptographic application that models real-life signature.
There are two phases the signature phase and the verify phase (see Fig 2.1 and Fig
2.2).
5Ksk
Sig
SignMessage
Fig. 2.1.: Signing Phase
Kpk 
True or False 
Verify 
Message 
Sig 
Fig. 2.2.: Verification Phase
A digital signature consists of the following (M,S,K,K′,KEYGEN, SIGN,VERIFY)
where:
• M is the plaintext message space.
• S is the signature space.
6• K (set of possible keys for signature generation) is the signing key space.
• K′ (a set of possible verification keys) is the verification key space.
• KEYGen : N → K×K′ is an efficient key generation algorithm.
• SIGN : M ×K → S is an efficient signing algorithm.
• V ERIFY : S ×M ×K′ → {true, false} is an efficient verification algorithm.
A digital signature Sig is a proof that the signer has authenticated the signed
message. A concern is whether other parties can create forged signatures. Thus the
signing key ksig is the secret key sk. Anyone can verify the signature, so the verify
key kver is the public key pk. Common signatures schemes are RSA [27], DSS [22], El
Gamal [10] and ECDSA [1]. The RSA signature scheme is the scheme that is most
commonly used today.
2.1 RSA
In [8], Diffie and Hellman publicly suggested a need for a public-key encryption.
However they did not provide a public key-encryption method. In [27] Rivest, Shamir,
and Aldeman proposed a public key encryption method based on the difficulty of
factoring. Today, this is the most common public-key encryption used (and most
common digital signature algorithm used).
In the RSA cryptosystem, there are two keys, one is the public key (e,N), used
for encryption and publicly available, the other is the private (secret) key d used for
decryption. The cryptosystem is determined in the following manner. Suppose Bob
would like to set up a RSA cryptosystem. Bob chooses two distinct prime numbers
p and q that are suitably large. Bob set N = p · q. the Euler totient function
ϕ(N) = (p− 1) · (q − 1). Bob selects his public key e so that:
gcd(e, ϕ(N)) = 1.
7Thus e has a multiplicative inverse in Zϕ(N). Then Bob’s secret key d is computed as:
d = e−1 mod ϕ(N).
Bob’s public key is officially the pair (e,N).
Now if Alice would like to send a message m to Bob privately, she locates Bob’s
public key (e,N) and computes the ciphertext C by C = me mod N (see Algorithm
1) and sends C to Bob.
Bob decrypts C by computing:
m = Cd mod N .
The security of RSA is related to keeping d secret. Since e is public, it is necessary
to keep ϕ(N) secret (thus it is essential to keep both p and q secret). Further N is
made public and N = p · q. So N must be large enough that factoring algorithms
cannot be applied. In addition, since the factorization of N is dependent on its
smallest factors, the primes p and q are selected to be roughly the same bit size [14]
(see Fig 2.3 for reference concerning the size of keys).
Suppose the binary representation of e is given by e = ew−1ew−2 . . . e1e0 then me
mod N can be calculated as:
Algorithm 1 Compute me mod N
1: Set C ← 0, i← w − 1
2: while i ≥ 0 do
3: C ← C2 mod N
4: if ei ← 1 then
5: C ← C ·m mod N
6: end if
7: i← i− 1
8: end while
9: Output C
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2.1.1 RSA Signing
To sign a message M using RSA, you first compute the hash of M , m = h(M). You
sign the message M by computing Sig as:
Sig = md mod N ,
where d is the secret key. The message M and Sig are given to the entity(s) that
need the signature together with the signers public key (e,N). They can verify the
signature by:
comparing h(M) with Sige mod N .
If they are the same the signature is good, otherwise it is bad.
92.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
An elliptic curve, in the context of public-key cryptography, is a finite Abelian additive
group with a large prime subgroup [4, 11]. It is defined over a finite field, typically
over a prime field Zp or the Galois field (binary field) GF (2m). In general, let F be
a finite field, an elliptic curve E consists of all points (x, y) ∈ F× F, together with a
special point O (called the point of infinity), that satisfy:
y2 + a1xy = x
3 + a2x
2 + a3x+ a4.
Here there is a natural addition that can be executed where O is the additive identity.
For all points P ∈ E there exists a point −P ∈ E such that P +−P = O. Note the
computation of a negative point −P , depends on the field used. Suppose P = (x, y).
If the field that defines E is Zp, then −P = (x,−y). If the field that defines E is
GF (2m), then −P = (x, x+ y).
The fundamental cryptographic computation in an elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) is the scalar multiple of a point. That is, given a fixed public point P , that
belongs to the prime subgroup, compute the scalar multiple kP (which is P + P +
· · · + P = kP ). Let q denote the prime order of this large subgroup and let k =
knkn−1 · · · k2k1k0 denote the binary representation of k, then the algorithm to compute
kP is provided in Algorithm 2.
The Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem is such that given (F, E, q, P, kP ) it is
computationally hard to determine k. For security purposes the subgroup size should
be suitably large. In practice, a 160+ bit group size would provide a security level
equivalent to 1000+ bit RSA. For a highly sensitive application, like banking, one
would require larger keys, such as 220+ bit ECC key, equivalent to a 2000+ bit
RSA key. In practice, it is not wise for one to generate their own elliptic curve, but
fortunately there are precomputed elliptic curve that have been prescribed by the
federal government [23].
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ECC is often the cryptographic choice when one is working with in a constrained
computing environment, especially where signature generation is required. The es-
sential calculation in ECC is the scalar multiple as described in Algorithm 2. It is
important for the smart card to safeguard the key k from side channel attacks.
Here we describe an active side channel attack, a fault attack, where the adversary
will enact many fault attacks, collect the outputs and off-line use these faulty outputs
to determine the key. The adversary does not know where in the execution process
the attack occurs, just the type of attack.
Algorithm 2 Scalar Multiple
input E,P, k
output kP
1: Q = O
2: i = n
3: while i ≥ 0 do
4: Q = 2Q
5: if ki = 1 then
6: Q = Q+ P
7: end if
8: i = i− 1
9: end while
10: output Q
2.2.1 ECDSA
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) offers a variant of the
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with Elliptic Curve Cryptography, which is widely
used.
11
Key Size
A security level of 112 bits implies the attacker needs the equivalent of about 2112
operations to recover the private key, the size of a RSA public key is 2048 bits, whereas
ECDSA public key requires only 224 bits. On the other hand, the size of the signature
is identical for RSA and ECDSA, which is 4 times of the security level, around 320
bits (see Table [14]).
Signing Algorithm
Alice is to send a message to Bob. Both of them must agree on the parameters of
this algorithm, the Curve, P , and n.
• Curve The Elliptic Curve, which is in fact the field, to be involved.
• P The base point P on the ECC, also known as the generator, with large order.
• n The order of P , usually a prime, such that nP = O.
The digital signature follows the following steps: [1]
1. Do e = HASH(m), where HASH is a cryptographic hash function from the SHA
family, eg, SHA-2.
2. Let z be the Ln leftmost bits of e, where Ln is the bit length of the group order
n.
3. Select a random integer k from [1, n− 1].
4. Calculate the curve point (x1, y1) = k × P .
5. Calculate r = x1 mod n. If r = 0, go back to step 3.
6. Calculate s = k−1(z + rdA) mod n. If s = 0, go back to step 3. The signature
is the pair (r, s).
Note the signature requires a scalar multiple calculation.
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Verification Algorithm
Bob is to verify Alice’s signature, he must have Alice’s public key, a curve point QA,
which is need to be authenticated too: [1]
1. Check that QA is not equal to the identity element O, and its coordinates are
otherwise valid.
2. Check that QA lies on the curve.
3. Check that nQA = O.
Then Bob does the following:
1. Verify that r and s are integers in [1, n− 1]. If not, the signature is invalid.
2. Calculate e = HASH(m), where HASH is the same function used in the signa-
ture generation.
3. Let z be the Ln leftmost bits of e.
4. Calculate w = s−1 mod n.
5. Calculate u1 = zw mod n and u2 = rw mod n.
6. Calculate the curve point (x1, y1) = u1 × P + u2 ×QA.
7. The signature is valid if r ≡ x1 (mod n), invalid otherwise.
2.3 Computational Complexity of Public Key Algorithms
When implementing cryptography in a constrained environment, it is common to ex-
plore the use of implementing speedups. The security of a Public Key Cryptographic
algorithm mainly depends on the computational complexity of their hardest compo-
nents. For example, the hardness of Diffie Hellman relies on the speed of discrete
logarithm. Most of these public key systems involve computational hard operations,
which are much more expensive than symmetric cryptosystems, such as block ciphers.
13
Public-key cryptography can be computationally intensive, so often is constrained
environments, one attempts to reduce intensive computations. To speed up the sys-
tem, the intuitive way is to accelerate the base computation. For example, when
using RSA, one may decide to use the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) [31].
On average, such an implementation will reduce the running time to 1/4 of a RSA
calculation, because it reduces a n−bits exponentiation to two n
2
bit exponentiations.
Further in RSA one can explore reducing the computational complexity of the
exponentiation of me mod N . According to Algorithm 1, the bit length is the num-
ber of iterations of the loop in this algorithm. Hence a short bit-length and small
Hamming weight result in more efficient encryption. Smaller values of e (such as 3)
have been shown to be insecure in some settings.
Choosing a small value makes encryption fast to compute but if it is too small
where cipher text is lower than N . Since e is the public exponent it does not need
to be selected randomly. On the other hand, the value of d must be secret, so it
must be large and random. However, the most common use of RSA, especially in a
constrained environment, is as a signature scheme and the signing key is d.
An alternate idea is to reduce the hamming weight of key, expressing the key in
non-adjacent form (NAF) is a common way [26]. In this form, an integer is expressed
as aw−1 . . . a1a0 such that each symbol ai belongs to {−1, 0, 1} and no two consecutive
symbols ai=1 and ai are nonzero. The use of a signed digit representation of the
cryptographic key can reduce the number of complex computations that are needed
to perform the cryptographic operation, which results in reduced power consumption.
The non-adjacent form (NAF) of a number is a unique signed digit representation.
For example, the binary representation of the integer 622 is 1,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,1,0, and
it can be computed as 1, 0, 1, 0, 0,−1, 0, 0,−1, 0, which is 512 + 128 − 16 − 8. By
expressing a key in NAF form, one will reduce the number of nonzero symbols, it has
been shown that the expected percentage of nonzero symbols of a key in NAF form
is 1/3 [3].
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Algorithm 3 Reitwiesner’s canonical recoding [13,26]
1: INPUT: dn, ..., d0
2: OUTPUT: δn+1, ...., δ0
3: c0 ← 0
4: for j = 0 to n+ 1 do
5: cj+1 ← b(dj + dj+1 + cj)/2c
6: δj ← dj + cj − 2cj+1
7: end for
8: RETURN δn+1δn−1 . . . δ0
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In many algebraic settings the inverse is very efficient to compute. This is espe-
cially true when using elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC), where the inverse (nega-
tive) of an ECC point can be trivially computed from the ECC point. Thus the the
use of the symbol −1 in the NAF form is computationally efficient.
2.3.1 wNAF
By using non-adjacent form NAF form, the number of non zeros is to be reduced by
1/6. One can make even further saving on calculation by using wNAF form. “w”
here stands for “window”. We can also interpret wNAF as, there is not adjacent non
zero bits in any consecutive w symbols. Formally a key in wNAF form is:
Definition 1. A sequence of signed bits is called wNAF iff the following three prop-
erties hold [25]:
xxx (i) The most significant non-zero bit is positive.
xxx (ii) Among any w consecutive digits, at most one is nonzero.
xxx (iii) Each non-zero digit is odd and less than 2w−1 in absolute value.
Similar to NAF, wNAF form assures a unique form of an integer, but the hamming
weight is even smaller. The density of a wNAF key is 1
w+1
, on average 1 in every w+1
symbols is nonzero.
Table 2.1: wNAF Forms for 1622
Binary 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
NAF1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
3NAF 0 3 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 3 0
4NAF 0 3 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 0
1Here a “-” sign over a digit means negating the digit, eg, 3 denotes -3m.
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2.3.2 Generation of wNAF
The algorithm to generate a wNAF form binary is as follows: [16], note the term
mods is defined as: x mods y returns a value j, and y/2 ≤ j ≤ y/2, and j mod y = x
mod y. For example, 7 mods 24 = 7, while 9 mods 24 is not equal to 9 but -7, since 7
is greater than 24/2.
Algorithm 4 Generation of wNAF
input width w, and n-bit integer d
output width w, {σn, σn−1, · · · , σ0}w} is wNAF of d
1: i← 0
2: while d > 0 do
3: if d is even then
4: σi ← 0
5: else
6: σi ← dmods 2w
7: d← d− σi
8: end if
9: d← d/2; i← i+ 1;
10: end while
11: RETURN {σn, σn−1, · · · , σ0}w}
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The following shows how to compute the scalar multiple kP using a wNAF form
of a key.
Algorithm 5 Scalar Multiple with wNAF Key
input Base point P , secret key k
output Q = kP
1: for x← ±1,±3, · · · ,±2w−1 do
2: Compute K[x]← xP
3: end for
4: Set Q← O, i← n− 1
5: while i ≥ 0 do
6: Q← 2Q
7: if ki 6= 0 then
8: Q← Q+K[ki]
9: end if
10: end while
11: RETURN Q
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3. SMART CARD SECURITY
A Smart Card, also called chip card or integrated circuit card, is a plastic or paper
made pocket-size card embedded with an integrated circuit. A smart card provides a
tamper-proof storage of cardholders identity and account information. Smart Cards
are used in a variety of applications. Typically they play a role in some type of
proof/identification, i.e. in an authentication scheme. In an application, there is a
reader that interacts with the card and processes the data. The systems enhanced
with smart cards covers although the industries, such as banking, telecommunication,
E-commerce, health care, etc.
3.1 Architecture of Smart Card
The shape of smart card is restricted by International Organization for Standard-
ization (ISO), and the card that is the most often referred to is CR80, defining the
size, thickness, memory volume, but this is not the only type of card that is deployed
today. Special shape of cards are being heavily used, such as the cutoff card: SIM
card, Micro-SIM, and Mini-SIM.
The categorization of the smart card may lie in applications it is used for, such
as credit cards, satellite TV cards, cell phone cards, etc. In industry, the differences
can rely on the operation system. Two primary types of OS for a smart card are:
fixed file structure system and dynamic application system, which depends on the
requirement of particular applications. Another way to characterize smart cards
is from a security point of view, two primary type of smart card are: Symmetric
Key Encryption Capable and Asymmetric Key Encryption Capable. The defining
difference lies in the encryption capability of the OS and chip.
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3.2 Hardware Architecture
Smart cards’ functionality are embodied in a single small chip, with components as
follows: [33]
CPU 
Test Logic 
Security 
Logic 
EEPROM 
RAM 
ROM 
I/O 
Interface 
Fig. 3.1.: Smart Card Architecture
CPU(Central Processing Unit) The core of the chip, and all the computations,
including some related cryptographic processing, is completed within this part.
The frequency for the mainstream of current smart cards is 3.57MHz.
Test Logic A logic component to test the manufacturing errors.
Security Logic A verification function to test the environment of the card which
probability affects the security.
I/O Interface A functionality to accept external commands and send responses
according to particular communication protocols.
ROM The permanent memory, containing the operating system and self-testing API.
The size is 32KB for most smart card.
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RAM The re-writable memory for temporary values, such as session keys, internal
variables, stack data, etc. The size is typically 1kHz.
EEPROM Non-volatile updatable memory used for application data, which is de-
pending on the application type, eg, keys, PINs, phone number, balances, etc.
Also used for operating system and application code.
3.3 Smart Card Reader and Terminals
The smart card readers and terminals are devices used to access the card and obtain
data or perform a transaction. There are two types of cards, the defining difference
is basing on if the reading process requires a physical connection with the chip. The
former one is called contact-less card, and the latter one is contact card. The paper
[30] provides an excellent overview on the cards.
Contact-less Smart Card The chip on this type of card is usually hidden, which in-
volves electromagnetic induction to provide power from terminal to chip. When
the card comes closer to the reader, a radio frequency that helps the commu-
nication. Many of contact-less card are designed for Physical Access Control,
Transposition Applications, and payment, such as Electronic Toll Collection
(ETC) system being used on Express way. The dominant protocol under the
ISO 14443 is MIFARE, follows by EMV standards [30].
Contact Smart Card [33] This type of card requires a physical connection with
the card. From the Fig 3.3.
1. The Vcc and Ground Provide the power.
2. Reset Facilitates a hard restart of all processes.
3. Vpp Originally provided a higher EEPROM programming voltage, which
is no longer in use.
4. I/O This contact is a seriel channel for bi-directional communication be-
tween chip and the reader.
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Fig. 3.2.: Smart Card Architecture
Ground 
Vpp 
I/O 
Vcc 
Reset 
Clock 
Fig. 3.3.: Contact Card Connections
3.4 Smart Card Security
Smart cards provide enormous benefits of portable and tamper-proof storage of card-
holders identity and account information. As people access sensitive information,
which occurs in a large number of applications, the use and importance the security
of smart card rises.
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Security is needed to protect the information to be stolen, lost or altered. In
addition, according to formation and process in the implementation, security factors
both in time and space will be involved:
Security in Time Smart card is accessed when the data needed to be created, up-
dated, exchanged and stored via networks. The vulnerability within these pro-
cesses need to be considered and get rid of through those essential steps.
Security in Space In implementation of the smart cards, all of these elements below
are suspected to contain possible vulnerabilities:
1. Hardware Possible physical parts for smart card could be servers, storage
devices, communication channels, etc. All the devices possibly get the data
from the system could be attacked.
2. Software Operating system, database management software and even se-
curity management software itself.
3. Personnel Any human who could access to the hardware or software,
including professional personnel, administrative personnel, hardware or
software related staff.
3.4.1 Data Integrity
Data integrity is necessary to maintain the accuracy and consistency of data over the
entire lift-cycle. For smart card, needs this function to verify the data while creating
and updating. For example, a smart card could store the parent-to-child relationship
records. The data-integrity mechanism is such that no child record can exist without
related parent. This assures when a child’s information is inputted requiring a parent
information. This also prevents an unexpected deletion of a parent’s data which is
related to the child’s data.
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3.4.2 Authentication
The process insures the identity of people involved in the transaction. The strength
of authentication relies on how many factors are used to confirm the identity. For
example a employee ID authentication usually involves the ID number and date of
birth, maybe the name as well. The more factors involved, the less vulnerability to
the authentication there is. While this will also debase the efficiency and the user
experiences. Some speed-up mechanisms are often applied in this process.
3.4.3 Non-Repudiation
Non-repudiation is a service that provides proof of the integrity and origin of data, for
which the user cannot later deny. In this setting, the authentication can be asserted
to be genuine with high assurance. To achieve this, one needs to provide a proof of
data integrity in such a way that it cannot be later denied by the prover. A digital
signature is a common tool used.
3.4.4 Data Security Algorithm
Smart card involves two types of encryption algorithm:
Symmetric Key Encryption [30] The sender and receiver shares the same key.
The most famous symmetric encryption algorithm is Data Encryption Standard
(DES), which was standardized by NIST on the 1970s. To lengthen the use of
DES and satisfy the current security level for symmetric key cryptography,
triple-DES was developed, DES used with with three encryptions. The number
of keys could be three or two [20]. AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is
also a commonly used symmetric encryption [31].
Asymmetric Key Encryption There is another category of asymmetric key en-
cryption.
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3.5 Threads to Smart Card
For the card issuer, such as the bank, E-commerce company, etc., there are typically
two ways of using smart card, host based or card based.
In host based scheme, smart card is simply a data carrier. All the protection is
done from the host computer, while in the card based smart card is teated more as a
microprocessor. Both of them rely critically on security services such as authentica-
tion, data secrecy, data integrity, non-repudiation, etc.
The valuable and sensitive information is owned by the card issuer rather than
the card possessor. The possessor of the card can attempt to maliciously access these
secret information. Once the signing key is known to the adversary they can construct
a signature and bypass the necessary procedure, a result in a banking application
could imply unlimited access to the banks financial resources.
E-banking and e-commerce businesses are using smart cards to authenticate users
and secure online transactions. Hardware devices that are often used as security
tokens. Implemented in a number of applications with diverse security requirements,
such as banking and identification applications, the smart card may be used to provide
a signature, including applications that rely critically on security services such as
authentication, data secrecy, data integrity, non-repudiation, etc. This valuable and
sensitive information is owned by the card issuer rather than the card processor. The
possessor of the card can attempt to maliciously access these secret information. Once
the signing key is known to the adversary they can construct a signature and bypass
the necessary procedure, a result in a banking application could imply unlimited
access to the banks financial resources.
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3.6 Smart Card Attacks
Smart cards are small, cheap, portable and easy to get. Moreover, the enormous
sensitive usage, turn this tiny chip into a popular target for hackers. Manufacturers
and attackers are always challenging each other, while new advances are constructed,
but there is no 100% secure smart card. [33] There are three basic attacks: logical,
physical and Side-Channel attacks.
3.6.1 Logical Attack
In a logical attack, the attacker could try to exploit bugs in the following areas.
Software Implementation A smart card is a microprocessor. Excluding those
commnds it must perform to run, the chip supports thousands of additional
commands.This functionality may be abused for undesired data retrievals and
modifications.
Hidden Commands Smart card system theoretically supports more than 65000
commands, though only a few of them are required for a particular application.
The rest could be abused.
Parameter Positioning and Buffer Overflow By inputing an invalid parameter
value, which may be not allowed or exceed the length, will result in surprised
result. For example, if the input overflows the buffer size.
Crypto-Protocol, Design and Implementation Cryptographic protocols hand-
less the cryptographic operations on smart card. If the protocol is not carefully
designed, this hidden flaws may be affect the normal behavior of chip. For
example, some cards have fallback methods to enhance reliability in case of
technical problems, while this is right insecure and attacker may benefit from
creating fictitious functions.
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3.6.2 Physical Attack
In a physical attack, the attacker could try to exploit bugs in the following areas. An
overview of physical attacks is provided in [33].
Hardware This can be achieved by high-end lab equipment.
Chemical Solvents, Etching and Staining Material This is to decapsulate and
delayer the chip to reveal the building blocks. Then an optical and electrical
analysis can be involved to take a close look at the chip.
Optical and Electron Microscope Although the size of chip feature is below 1
micron, it is still visible through a electron, even an optical microscope. A
carefully designed chip still can be analyzed to reveal its active sections, running
code and even values on the data bus.
Probe Stations A tiny probe is placed on an arbitrary wire to produce a new chan-
nel. If the data bus is able to be located via the above two approaches, all
the data transfer can be intercepted, eg, programing code, programing data,
including keys.
Contactless Attack As it is mentioned before, smart card can communicate with
the terminal with any physical connection using the Radio-Frequency Identifier
(RFID). The effective range for RFID is around 10cm. Kfir and Wool [15]
show a picking virtual pocket using relay attacks on this contactless smartcard
system, that is to trick the reader into communicating with a victim smartcard
that is far away. The attack system contains two parts, the “ghost” and “leech”.
The leech is 50cm away from the card, doing the reading. The data will send
afar to the ghost. And the ghost can be up to 50 meters away from the card
reader with 3 orders of magnitude higher than the normal, working as a middle
terminal transmit the data to the reader. This scheme provides an unlimited
distance for the attack on the RFID system.
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3.6.3 Side Channel Attack
A side channel attack attempts to exploit some physical phenomena to analyze or
modify the smart card behavior, such as time, power, etc.
Many attacks on smart cards have been categorized as side-channel attacks. In
reality, cryptographic algorithms are always implemented in software or hardware on
physical devices with interact with and are influenced by their environments. The
physical interactions can be investigated and monitored by adversaries, and may
result in information useful in cryptanalysis. This type of information is called sign
channel information and the attacks exploiting side-channel information are called
side-channel attacks [34].
3.6.4 Passive Attack
Some side channel attacks are passive attacks, which attempt to learn information
about the key by listening to some side-channels without interfering with the compu-
tation, in a word, it is attempting to break the system solely based upon observing
data, e.g, voltage, timing, etc. Kocher [18] introduces a timing attack on implemen-
tation of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS (Digital Signature Standard), and other systems.
By closely monitoring the running time of signing operations, people can easily find
the property of secret key, this kind of attack is not time consuming at all.
Timing Attack Since the operations of execution of programing code varies, tim-
ing attack monitors the CPU, memory, simply based on comparing how much
time each operation takes. Then analyze what exactly the code is. Statistic is
involved in this attack.
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Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA) EMA is used widely in smart card attacks. It
is based on leaked electromagnetic radiation which can directly provide secret
information of chip. To develop this type of tools requires advanced knowledge
of hardware and signal processing. Such measurements can also be used in
power analysis.
3.6.5 Active Attack
Another type of attack is an active attack, which is, persistent attempt to introduce
invalid data into a system, and/or to damage or destroy data already stored in it. In
many countries, it is a criminal offense to attempt any such action.
A fault attack is a side-channel attack which is an active attack. The fault at-
tack is caused by inducing a fault into the smart card, while the device is executing
the program. The adversary then observes all channels of information, including
the output, in an attempt to recover information about the key. These attacks are
fundamentally different from passive side-channel attacks. In [6]Boneh, DeMillo and
Lipton constructed a fault attack (Bellcore Attack) demonstrating how a malicious
user can recover the secret key information from the card. In this paper we discuss
fault attacks on an essential cryptographic elliptic curve computation, as well as RSA.
3.6.6 Sign Change Fault Attack
Fault attack is a type of side channel attack in the field of cryptography. The prin-
ciple is to induce faults-unexpected environmental conditions-into cryptographic im-
plementations, to reveal internal states and/or faulty outputs.
In earlier work, fault attacks on ECC worked on moving the scalar multiplication
to a different or even weaker curve. However, this can be easily detected by verifying
the parameters and that the resulting point belongs to the original curve. The attack
described in Blo¨mer, Otto and Seifert [5] results in a faulty point on the original
curve. This attack involves a sign change on Q (the accumulator) as described in
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Algorithm 2. In their attack, Q becomes −Q at some iteration i. In their work
they used Theorem 1, as well as the following notation. Above we are adopting
the following notation. If k is the key then for each i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ n, define
Li(k) =
∑i
j=0 2
jkj and Hi(k) =
∑n
j=i 2
jkj. Thus Li(k) represents the low i + 1 bits
of key k and Hi(k) represents the high n − i + 1 bits of the key k. Consequently
k = Ln(k) = H0(k).
Theorem 1. Let B be a set of n balls numbered 1 to n. Let m be an integer where
m  n and C be an integer where 1 ≤ C ≤ n. Suppose we randomly select C many
balls from B without replacement. Let A be the event that for every interval I of
length m of the interval [1, n] there exists a ball b with b ∈ I that was selected. If
C ≥ n
m
log 2n then Prob(A) ≥ 1
2
.
Assuming one is using an algorithm like Algorithm 2, then the faulty output Q˜
can be represented as:
Q˜ = (−Hi(k) + Li−1(k))P
= (−Hi(k) +−Li−1(k) + Li−1(k) + Li−1(k))P
= −Q+ 2Li−1(k)P.
Then the attacker makes sufficient number C of faulty sign change attacks, here
they used the constant C = n
m
log 2n. They then execute an off-line analysis, using
their table of c many faults, predicting keybits from lowest to highest. By computing
C many faults they satisfy that the probability that every interval I of 0 to n − 1,
which has length m, has a faulty Q˜ with the fault at i ∈ I exceeds 1/2. Thus they
will be able to compute the secret key by executing this procedure on average twice.
Here m is a parameter such that exponential work in m is feasible as an off-line
computation.
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3.6.7 Counter Fault Attack on ECC
A novel fault attack is described in King and Wang [17]. During the execution of
Algorithm 2, a fault is injected into the calculation and implicitly lands on line 2.
That is, i← i−1 was skipped at one iteration. This is equivalent to alter the original
k to the faulty k denoted as kˆ as below:
kˆ = kn−1 · · · ki+1kikiki−1 · · · k1k0.
Instead of computing Q = kP , the output will be:
Q˜ = kˆP = 2Q+ 2ikiP − Li−1 (k)P. (3.1)
The Equation 3.1 can also be expressed as:
Q˜ = kˆP = Hi (k)P + 2
ikiP +Q. (3.2)
This indicates that we can also achieve the same goal by guessing the highest bits to
lowbits.
In [17] they introduced the concept of a valid pattern. Because faults produce
key expressions of the form kn−1kn−2 . . . ki+1kikiki−1 . . . k1k0, and because a faulty
output is of the form Q˜ = 2Q + 2ikiP − Li−1(k)P , they characterized that a valid
pattern (“guess”) xjxj−1xj−2, . . . should be tested with the term of (−2jxj+2j−1xj−1+
2j−2xj−2+· · · )P . They observed that 0xxx . . . is the same as 0000xxx . . ., in the sense
of the testing value (−2jxj + 2j−1xj−1 + · · · )P . If the first string is deemed to be
successful as a “good guess” then the second string will also be successful. One needs
to consider patterns that have a leading zero, this is needed due to the fact that
fault could have been generated at some i for which ki = 0. Thus they [17] noted
that a guess should either have the leading bit which is nonzero (so we test with
(−2j + 2j−1xj−1 + · · · )P or the leading bit is zero but the next bit is nonzero. Also,
there is a problem concerning guesses with a leading bit which is a one. For example,
given the guess 11101, they would test with (−24 ·1+23 ·1+22 ·1+2 ·0+1)P = −3P .
At the same time, for valid pattern 101 they will test with (−22 + 1)P = −3P . Thus
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for different valid patterns they would use the same test value, there is no way we can
distinguish if the keybits were 101 or 11101. So they found that for valid patterns
with a leading one, they could not determine multiple keybits, they did note they
could determine one keybit, that the low-bit of the pattern is the correct keybit.
Definition 2. [17] A valid pattern x = xν , . . . , x1 is a binary sequence of length ν
where 1 ≤ ν ≤ m such that either (i) we have xν = 1 or (ii) we have ν ≥ 2, xν = 0
and xν−1 = 1.
Notice that ”all zeros” is not a possible valid pattern, in the King et. al. [17]
construction. If an adversary is convinced that a fault has occurred on an interval
of length m, and all valid patterns fail then the adversary knows that a sequence of
zeros occurs in the keystream. The adversary cannot determine the number of zeros,
but they do know at least one zero occurred.
Algorithm to Recover the Bits
So the adversary induces C many counter faults and stores them in the database.
Initially the adversary knows no key bits so they set r = −1, r + 1 is the number
of known key bits. Because there are C faults, then [17] every interval of length m
has a fault. They start looking at all valid patterns, once they form a guess they
compute Gx = (−2jxj + 2j−1xj−1 + · · ·+ x0)P if there exists a faulty output Q˜ such
that Gx + Q˜ = 2Q then they found key bits xj, .., x0. If all key bits fail then k0 = 0.
They increment r appropriately. At the next iteration they compute Gx as:
Gx = L+ (−2r+νxr+ν +
r+ν−1∑
j=r+1
xj2
j)P.
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Here L is the r+1 know lower keybits scalar multiple L = Lr+1(k)P . Lastly, once
the number of “known keybits” exceeds n−m then we cannot claim that there is a
fault in B for which the bit position i occurs in {n−m+1, . . . n−1}. However we can
determine the remaining keybits by exhaustive search, since there are at most m− 1
many unknown bits. This would require at most 2m−1 steps (and m was selected so
that 2m steps is reasonable).
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Algorithm 6 The Counter Fault Attack
1: Let B ← (n/m) log(2n)
2: Create B faulty outputs of Algorithm 2 by inducing a fault on counter i, where i
occurs uniformly random on {0, . . . , n− 1}, so that it prevents a decrementation
3: Let B = {Q˜fj : fj is the jth counter fault of Algorithm 2 with inputs k and P ,
j = 1, . . . , B}
4: Set r ← −1 {here r+ 1 represents the number of least significant bits of k known
by the attacker, initially r + 1 = 0}
5: while r ≤ n−m do
6: Let L ← O +∑rj=0 kj2jP {here keybits {kj : j < r} of the secret key k are
known by the adversary}
7: for all valid patterns x = xr+ν , . . . , xr+1 (see Definition 2) do
8: Let Gx ← L+ (−2r+νxr+ν +
∑r+ν−1
j=r+1 xj2
j)P
9: for Q˜ ∈ B do
10: {The following is the verification step and tests if valid pattern x is correct}
11: if (Gx + Q˜) = 2Q then
12: if r + 1 ≤ 0 then
13: W ← Algorithm 7(x, q, P,Gx, Q˜, Q)
14: if W 6= NIL then
15: output W {Comment: In this case W equals the key k}
16: end if
17: else
18: if xr+ν = 0 then
19: Conclude kr+1 = xr+1, . . . , kr+ν = xr+ν
20: Set r ← r + ν and continue go to line 5.
21: else
22: Set kr+1 = xr+1 and let r ← r + 1 and continue go to line 5.
23: end if
24: end if
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Algorithm 6 Counter Fault Attack cont’d
25: end if
26: end for
27: end for
28: if no valid pattern satisfies the verification step then
29: Set kr+1 = 0 and let r ← r + 1
30: end if
31: end while
32: if r < n then
33: At this point the adversary knows key bits kr . . . , k1k0 where r > n −m. By
exhaustive search determine kn−1, . . . , kr+1 so that Q = kP .
34: if exhaustive search fails to produce Q = kP then
35: return “failure”
36: end if
37: else
38: if Q 6= kP then
39: return “failure”
40: end if
41: end if
42: output k
3.6.8 Counter Fault Attack on RSA
We implemented the algorithm and applied it to RSA. During this implementation
we discover an error. The problem is King and Wang [17] never took into account
the possibility of multiple consecutive occurrences of all valid patterns failing, which
causes a 0 as the known keybits, if this happened for example three consecutiveness
times then we will generate 000, but consecutive zeros is problematic. We solved this
by constructing the following state machine for the counter fault attack.
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Algorithm 7 Algorithm to Recover k When r + 1 = 0, and xr+ν = 1 or xr+ν = 0
Input : a, q, P,Gx, Q˜, Q
1: Let b = q−a {Comment: Recall that to enter this algorithm we have Gx+Q˜ = 2Q
and r + 1 = 0. Here aP = Gx where a = −2r+νxr+ν +
∑r+ν−1
j=r+1 2
j. There are two
cases to consider: xr+ν = 1 and xr+ν = 0 }
2: if xr+ν = 1 then
3: if bP = −Q then
4: return −b mod q {Comment: In this case ki = 0 and i = n− 1, so b = −k }
5: end if
6: else
7: if (b− 2 · 2n−1)P = −Q then
8: return −(b − 2 · 2n−1) mod q {Comment: this is the case i = n − 1 and
kn−1 = 1, so −(b− 2 · 2n−1) mod q = k}
9: end if
10: end if
11: return NIL
36
      1 0
0-11-0 
States Machine for Simulation of Counter Fault Attack 
Fig. 3.4.: State Machine for Counter Fault Attack
The state machine in counter fault attack with regular keys possesses four states:
“0” state, “1” state, “01” state, and “10” state.
The algorithm to apply the counter fault attack to RSA is as follows: The adver-
sary creates a fault to the counter (i) during the computation of Sig = Mk mod N .
The adversary does NOT NEED to know the iteration count where the fault takes
place. Sig = Sig · Sig ·M2iki−Li−1(k)
We implemented the algorithm to attack RSA using the Indiana University su-
percomputer Quarry. Our results are provided in Fig 3.5.
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Algorithm 8 Counter Fault Attack
1: Make n
m
log(2n) faulty signature faulty signatures faultySig
2: s = −1 (s+ 1 represents the number of known keybits)
3: while s < n−m do
4: compute L = M
∑s
j=0 2
jkj
5: for r = 0uptom do
6: for all valid patterns (xs+1, xs+2, xs+r) do
7: Gx = L ∗M
∑r+v−1
j=r+1 2
jxj−2r+vxr+v
8: if Gx · faultySig = Sig2 then
9: kr+1 = xr+1, kr+2 = xr+2, · · · , kr+v = xr+v
10: s = s+ r
11: end if
12: end for
13: if no valid patterns then
14: set kr+1 = 1, s = s+ 1
15: end if
16: r = r + 1
17: end for
18: end while
19: brute force complete remaining m bits of k
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RSA modulus 
length (bits)
Secure until
Year
Window
Size(m) 
Number of 
Faults (C)
Running
Time(* Indiana 
Univ. super 
computer 
Quarry)
1184 2013 10 1127 60 sec 
2048 2023 20 1229 5 minutes
4096 2051 20 2663 35 minutes
6172 2069 20 4194 3 hour 26 
minutes
Fig. 3.5.: Simulation Results for Counter Fault Attack on RSA Using a Supercom-
puter
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4. NEW ATTACKS
4.1 Analysis: the Plausibility of Sign Change Fault Attack
This attack involves a changing the sign of an elliptic curve point. Blo¨mer et. al.
discussed the use of a key expressed in NAF form. The use of a NAF representation
does not increase the chances of the sign change attack as the attack is on the memory
of the point and not on a program instruction. In an implementation of ECC one
would not use a sign bit to represent the ECC point. Further in the various fields
that are used to build an ECC application, the negative of a point may not need a
sign bit. Recall in GF (2m), if P = (x, y) then −P = (x, y + x), here addition is an
xor, no sign bits needed. In Zp, if P = (x, y) then −P = (x,−y), thus a negative
could be used. But it would never be used in an efficient implementation, as −y is
computed modulo p. Thus −y = p− y mod p. Hence a negative would never be used
and certainly not used in GF (2m).
Consequently the impact to force Q to become −Q would be a significant series of
field operations and difficult to generate via a fault. One could attempt to infer that
this could occur based on the use of a NAF representation, but causing a fault on an
instruction based on k being 1 or −1 would not be sufficient to cause the accumulator
to go from Q to −Q.
Lastly one could view the Sign Change attack as a key stream attack perhaps as
the key traveled on the bus from memory to CPU. But the modification of the key
along this transmission would be highly selective. For example a sequence in NAF
form (it is not necessary to be in NAF form):
1, 0,−1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0,−1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1
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would be modified to:
−1, 0, 1, 0,−1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1
So that only 1 and −1 are modified for all j > i, 0’s remain unchanged.
We now describe two more plausible fault attacks, one on the key stream and the
other on a program instruction.
4.2 Bit Flip Attack BFA
As described earlier, the Sign Change attack can be argued as an attack on the
key stream where key bits (belonging to {−1, 0, 1} are flipped in sign. If b is a bit,
let flip (b) denote the flipped bit. Thus b ⊕ flip (b) = 1, where ⊕ denotes an xor.
We now discuss the BIT FLIP attack. In this case we assume that the key stream
knkn−1 . . . k2k1k0 is attacked such that there exists an i, for all j ≥ i, kˆj = flip (kj)
and for all j < i, kˆj = kj.
Example 1. Suppose k is given by k = k17 . . . k0 = 101001101001101001 and there is
an attack at i = 13, then the key stream, denoted by kˆ is:
kˆ = kˆ17 . . . kˆ13kˆ12 . . . kˆ0 = kˆ17 . . . kˆ13k12 . . . k0 = 010111101001101001.
Thus Q = kP =
∑n
i=0 ki2
iP and we represent kˆP by Q˜ then:
Q˜ =
n∑
j=0
kˆj2
jP
=
i−1∑
j=0
kˆj2
jP +
n∑
j=i
kˆj2
jP
=
i−1∑
j=0
kj2
jP +
n∑
j=i
flip(kj)2
jP
=
i−1∑
j=0
kj2
jP +
n∑
j=i
flip(kj)2
jP +
n∑
j=i
kj2
jP −
n∑
j=i
kj2
jP
= Li−1(k)P + (2n+1 − 2i)P −Hi(k)P
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Q˜ = Li−1(k)P + (2n+1 − 2i)P −Hi(k)P
= Li−1(k)P + Li−1(k)P − Li−1(k)P + (2n+1 − 2i)P −Hi(k)P
= (2Li−1(k) + 2n+1 − 2i)P −Q.
Therefore if Q˜ is a faulty scalar multiple, produced by the bit flip attack (BFA) then
there exists i such that:
Q =
(
2Li−1 (k) + 2n+1 − 2i
)
P − Q˜. (4.1)
An important question to be considered: for a given Q˜ will the ”i” be unique? Suppose
for a given faulty output Q˜, there exist i and i′, i 6= i′, such that:
Q˜ = (2Li−1(k) + 2n+1 − 2i)P −Q = (2Li′−1(k) + 2n+1 − 2i′)P −Q. (4.2)
This would imply that:
(
2Li−1 (k)− 2i
)
P =
(
2Li′−1 (k)− 2i′
)
P, (4.3)
as we are working over prime subgroup this implies the scalar must be equivalent mod
q, i.e. 2Li−1(k)−2i = 2Li′−1(k)−2i′ . This implies that 2Li−1(k)+2i′ = 2Li′−1(k)+2i.
Let’s assume without loss of generality that i > i′.
Table 4.1: Comparion Fault at i and at i′ Where i > i′
i i′
2i
′
0 0 · · · 1 · · · 0
2Li−1(k) * * · · · * · · · 0
2i 1 0 · · · 0 · · · 0
2Li′−1(k) 0 0 · · · x · · · 0
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By Table 4.1, we see there are two cases to consider when 2Li−1(k) + 2i′ =
2Li′−1(k) + 2i. One, if xi′ = 1 (of 2Li′−1(k)) then ∗i′ = 0 (of 2Li−1(k)) and ∗j = 0
for i′ < j < i and ∗i = 1. Second, if xi′ = 0 (of 2Li′−1(k)) then ∗j = 1 (of 2Li−1(k))
for i′ ≤ j < i and ∗i = 0. For example, we see we will have trouble distinguishing
1000∗∗ with 0001xx and 0111∗∗ with 0000xx, respectively. However if both 1000∗∗
and 0001xx are correct then ∗1 = x1 and ∗2 = x2.
Example 2. Note that if we tested a sequence like 011111 (here i = 5) with a faulty
scalar multiple Q˜ and the result was a hit, i.e.Q˜ = (2∗ (011111)P + 2n+1P −25P −Q,
then we know that there may exist a sequence of the form 000 ∗ ∗∗but which? That is,
000000, 000001, 000011, 000111, and 001111 are all possible illustrations of a i′ where
i′ = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 respectively. For example if i=5 and Li−1 represented by 011111 and
i′ = 3 and Li′−1 is represented by 000111, then 0111110 +001000 = 0001110+100000.
Thus by the above example we see we must test multiple cases. We define bi-
nary sequences 01111 · · · 1 ∗ · · · ∗, 10 · · · 0 ∗ · · · ∗, 0 · · · 01 ∗ · · · ∗ and 0 · · · 0 ∗ · · · ∗ as
D-Patterns. For each D-Pattern, we define its complementary pattern by the above
observation. Thus 1000** with 0001** are complementary patterns and 0111** with
0000** are complementary patterns. A given D-Pattern may have multiple comple-
mentary patterns. For example, the D-Pattern 011111 has complimentary patterns
000000, 000001, 000011, 000111, and 001111. Thus if a D-Pattern like 011111 tests
as correct, according to Equation (4.1), then one should test if any one of 000000,
000001, 000011, 000111, and 001111 is correct. For example, if 000111 is also cor-
rect then we know the two lowest bits 11 are keybits, we call these the low bits of
the complementary pattern. Also we will have a problem if the faulty output occurs
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on the first bit position of the interval, in the sense we are testing for Li−1(k) and
using 2i, thus if i = 0 then Li−1(k) is void/empty. We work around the problem by
searching over an interval of length m+ 2. Our algorithm, see Algorithm 14, is very
similar to the algorithm by Blo¨mer et. al. [5]. We will generate c = n
m
log 2n many
BIT FLIP faults. By computing c many faults they satisfy that the probability that
every interval I of 0 to n, which has length m, has a faulty Q˜ with the fault at i ∈ I
exceeds 1/2, again this uses a result by Boneh et. al. in [6].
4.3 Bit Flip Attack on RSA
The previous section referred to the BFA on ECC. What if it is applied to the RSA
system, with scalar multiple substituted by exponentiation.
C = M(2Li−1(k)+2
n+1−2i) · C˜−1. (4.4)
Then:
C˜ = M(2Li−1(k)+2
n+1−2i) · C−1. (4.5)
If there is i = i′ giving the same output C˜, then:
M(2Li−1(k)+2
n+1−2i) · C−1 = M
(
2Li′−1(k)+2n+1−2i
′)
· C−1. (4.6)
Since C−1 on both side is the same which equivalent to:
M(2Li−1(k)+2
n+1−2i) = M
(
2Li′−1(k)+2n+1−2i
′)
. (4.7)
then (2Li−1 (k) + 2n+1 − 2i) =
(
2Li′−1 (k) + 2n+1 − 2i′
)
mod p. As it is a subgroup of
a prime, we can conclude (2Li−1 (k) + 2n+1 − 2i) =
(
2Li′−1 (k) + 2n+1 − 2i′
)
, which
is (2Li−1 (k)− 2i) =
(
2Li′−1 (k)− 2i′
)
. But if the modulus N is composite, then
(2Li−1 (k) + 2n+1 − 2i) =
(
2Li′−1 (k) + 2n+1 − 2i′
)
mod ϕ(N) .
This is equavalent to:
2 (Li−1 (k)− Li′−1 (k)) =
(
2i − 2i′) mod ϕ(N).
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The modulus is composite, where the solution is no longer unique. Let’s name the
left hand side of the equation as LHS, and the right hand side as RHS. As i ≥ i’,
LHS = RHS + kϕ, where k is non-negative integer. Li−1 (k) − Li′−1 (k) has i bits,
so its double, LHS, is i + 1 bits long. While the LHS is i − 1 bit long. If i < n − 1,
then i + 1 < n. LHS couldn’t be greater than φ, k can only be 0. If i = n− 1, then
i+1 = n. LHS could be n+1 bits long, k can be either 0 or 1. But this only happens
when our guessing moves on to the highest bit. In the algorithm, the last several bits
could be recovered by a brute force testing.
Li-1(k) (Lower i – 1 bits) 
Li’-1(k)  (Lower I’ – 1 bits) 
i 
i' 
Li-1 (k) – Li’-1 (k) 
000000 ………………………………………………………………………0 
i bits long 
Li-1 (k) – Li’-1 (k) 
000000 ………………………………………………………………………0 
i +1 1 bits long 
Fig. 4.1.: 2 (Li−1 (k)− Li′−1 (k))
1000……………………………….……………………………………………………………………………0 
1000……………………………………………………………………………0 
011111111111111 
2i 
2i’ 
i 
i' 
2i - 2i’ 
100000 ………………………………………………………………………0 
i -1 bits long 
Fig. 4.2.:
(
2i − 2i′) mod ϕ(N)
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Outline of Bit Flip Attack
Algorithm 9 Outline of Bit Flip Attack
1: Initialize Key = 0. Let m denote a suitable window size, we attempt to recover
at most m bits at a time. Thus 2m work must be feasible.
2: Create C = n
m
log(2n) many faulty scalar multiples using Bit Flip attack, location
of each fault is random. Store each faulty output in a database.
3: while entire key is not known do
4: for each “suitable pattern” where the length of pattern , satisfies ≤ m+ 1 do
5: compare it to each faulty output in the database.
6: if Equation 4.1 is satisfied then
7: record the known key bits (will be ≤ )
8: increment the known key bit counter by the appropriate value.
9: end if
10: end for
11: end while
4.3.1 Running Time of Algorithm
The number of faults to be injected in the system is n
m
log(2n), as we mentioned in
Chapter 3. The running time of algorithm depends on length of key n and width
of “window” m. After each successful guess, we update our key, and increment the
search position, and we are guaranteed to increase our search position by one for every
iteration. As there are at most n iterations, we could conclude the running time to
be:
T = O(C × n
m
× 2m).
T = O(key length× number of faults× number of valid patterns× pattern width).
(4.8)
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n 
m 
Fig. 4.3.: Running Time
Worst Case Analysis
The worst case is, when moving on with each chunk, has to go over all the possible
patterns and find an agreement. Then the number of patterns for each window size
is 21 + 22 + · · ·+ 2m−1 + 2m, which is 2(2m − 1) in summation. Hence:
T = O(C × n
m
× 2m) = O(C × n
m
× 2(2m − 1)) = 2C × n2
m − 1
m
.
When m increases, we see T increases. If we do differentiate T with respect to m,
then:
dT
dm
= 2× C × n× (2m−1 − 2
m − 1
m2
).
Best Case
When moving the window with each successful discovery of keybits we see:
T = O(C × n
m
× 1) = O(C × n
m
).
Average Case
The average case is that it is needed to go over half of the all valid patterns for each
m bits, which is 2(2
m−1)
2
= 2m − 1. Then:
T = O(C × n
m
× (2m − 1)).
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2Cn 
T 
m 1 
Fig. 4.4.: Running Time Plot of Worst Case
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Algorithm 10 Bit Flip Attack
1: Let c← n
m
log(2n)
2: Create c BIT FLIP faulty outputs of Algorithm 2 by inducing a BIT FLIP fault
on counter i, where i occurs uniformly random on {0, . . . , n},
3: Let B = {Q˜fj : fj is the jth BIT FLIP fault of Algorithm 2 with inputs k and P ,
j = 1, . . . , c}
4: Set r ← −1 {here r+ 1 represents the number of least significant bits of k known
by the attacker, initially r + 1 = 0}
5: while r ≤ n−m do
6: Let L ← O +∑rj=0 kj2jP {here keybits {kj : j < r} of the secret key k are
known by the adversary}
7: for all binary sequences x = xr+ν , . . . , xr+1 of length ν < m+ 2 do
8: Let Gx ← L+ (
∑r+ν
j=r+1 xj2
j)P
9: for all Q˜ ∈ B do
10: if (2Gx − 2r+ν+1)P = Q− 2n+1P +−Q˜ then
11: if x = xr+ν , . . . , xr+1 is a D-Pattern then
12: for all complementary patterns ω of x do
13: if complementarity pattern ω when concatenated to L tested ac-
cording to Equation (4.1) is proved to be correct then
14: r = r + number of low bits of the complementary pattern
15: insert low bits of the complementary pattern into key stream k
and update L
16: break out of for loop
17: end if
18: end for
19: end if
20: else
21: r = r + ν
22: kr+ν = xr+ν , . . . , kr+1 = xr+1
23: end if
24: end for
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Algorithm 10 Bit Flip Attack cont’d
25: end for
26: end while
27: if r < n then
28: At this point the adversary knows key bits kr . . . , k1k0 where r > n −m. By
exhaustive search determine kn, . . . , kr+1 so that Q = kP .
29: if exhaustive search fails to produce Q = kP then
30: return “failure”
31: end if
32: else
33: if Q 6= kP then
34: return “failure”
35: end if
36: end if
37: output k
4.4 Doubling Attack
In our second attack we assume that the adversary can generate a fault on step 4 of
Algorithm 2 so that the doubling of Q is skipped for some iteration i. The execution
bypasses the instruction Q = 2Q and proceeds to executing the key bit test if ki == 1
to determine if an add is necessary. Thus all key bits are executed but they are not
added properly, and the output is faulty given by Q˜. The analysis is given by:
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Q˜ = (2n−1kn + · · ·+ 2i−1ki + 2i−1ki−1 + · · ·+ 2k1 + k0)P
= Hi(k)
1
2
P + Li− 1(k)P
= Hi(k)
1
2
P + Li−1(k)
1
2
P + Li−1(k)
1
2
P
=
1
2
Q+ Li−1(k)
1
2
P.
Here 1
2
Q denotes the point V such that 2V = Q.
To illustrate this attack, consider the following example. Suppose we are comput-
ing kP where k is given by 110101101001. The scalar multiple kˆP that is actually
calculated, is described by the following Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Illustration of Doubling Attack
k 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
after fault 1 0 0 1
consequence 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
of fault
As in the 8th iteration, Q is prevented from being doubled, which is equivalent to
shift all the higher 8 bits to the right by one,where the 8th bit is overlapped by the
7th bit(count from the MSB). Hence:
kˆ = 11010110 + 1001 = 11010111001.
Denote the points 1/2P by Phalf and 1/2Q by Qhalf . Then:
Q˜ = Qhalf + Li−1(k)Phalf . (4.9)
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Since the keyspace is Zq, for prime q, the integer q+12 is such that 2· q+12 = 1 mod q.
Thus 2−1 = q+1
2
. Hence Qhalf =
q+1
2
Q and Phalf =
q+1
2
P . An alternate way to
compute the half of an ECC point. On the right hand side of Equation 4.9, there
are several elements that need to be determined: Phalf , Qhalf . The half of a point
can be computed by the logarithm of Knudsen [35]. Let P = (x, y) then P can be
represented as P = (x, λ) where λ = x+ y
x
, rather than affine coordinates P = (x, y).
Let W = (u, λW ) represent the half of point P , i.e. W =
1
2
P . We denote P by
P = (x, λP ). Then λW can be determined by solving:
λ2W + λW = a+ x. (4.10)
Once one solved for λW , the x-coordinate can be determined by first computing:
tmp = x(λW + λP + x+ 1). (4.11)
Now observe that TRACE(a + x) must equal 0, which is true if and only if P
is the double of some point, an observation that is used in both [35]. Recall that
there are two solutions to Equation 4.10, how do we know if we have computed the
correct solution, i.e. is λW correct? (The other solution is λW + 1.) For this setting,
if λW is correct then the x-coordinate of W is
√
tmp. However if λW is incorrect, i.e.
the correct coordinate is λW + 1 then x-coordinate of W is
√
tmp+ x (here x is the
x-coordinate of P ). How do we determine the correct λ? This is achieved by noting
that the point is such that the computed x coordinate must satisfy a trace condition.
Further TRACE(tmp) = TRACE(
√
tmp). So if TRACE(tmp + a) = 0 we see that
λW is correct, otherwise we should use λW + 1. This is summarized in Algorithm 11.
The details of this attack are very analogous to those of BIT FLIP attack. The
test condition to search for is Li−1(k)Phalf = Q˜−Qhalf .
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Algorithm 11 Halving a point
Input P = (x, λ)
Output W = HALF (P )
1: Solve for λW in the equation λ
2
W + λW = a+ x.
2: tmp = x(λW + λ+ x+ 1)
3: if TRACE(tmp+ a) 6= 0 then
4: tmp = tmp+ x
5: λW = λW + 1
6: u =
√
tmp
7: end if
8: u =
√
tmp
9: return W = (u, λW )
4.4.1 For a Given Q˜ Will the “i” be Unique?
Again, suppose for a given faulty output Q˜, there exists i and i′, i 6= i′, such that:
Q˜ = Qhalf + Li−1(k)Phalf = Qhalf + Li′−1(k)Phalf . (4.12)
Since Qhalf is a constant, then:
Li−1(k)Phalf = Li′−1(k)Phalf .
Here Phalf is a nonzero constant too, which implies:
Li−1(k) = Li′−1(k),
as we are working over prime subgroup this implies the scalar must be equivalent. So
the value of Li−1(k) and Li′−1(k) are equal. There are two possibilities here: first,
i = i′; Second, i > i′, then xi, xi−1 · · ·xj+1 are all equal to 0. We can still conclude
there is no collision for recovered bit stream.
53
Doubling Attack on RSA
As we mentioned before, RSA involves exponentiation instead of scalar multiple.
Hence the half of P and Q becomes
√
P and
√
Q. In this system:
Phalf =
√
P ,
Qhalf =
√
Q =
√
P d,
where d is an odd integer, so we cannot use P
1
2
d as the result. Need to find the
square root named ”quadratic residue” for P and Q. However, the ability to compute
square roots modulo a composite is equivalent to factoring, which is infeasible to
the adversary. Consequently, due to the infeasibility of computing a square root the
Double Attack cannot be executed for the RSA cryptosystem.
Algorithm 12 Outline of Doubling Attack
1: Compute 1
2
P and 1
2
Q.
2: Initialize Key = 0. Let m denote a suitable window size, we attempt to recover
at most m bits at a time. Thus 2m work must be feasible.
3: Create C = n
m
log(2n) many faulty scalar multiples using Doubling attack, loca-
tion of each fault is random. Store each faulty output in a database.
4: while entire key is not known do
5: for each “suitable patterns where the length of pattern satisfies ≤ m + 1 do
6: compare it to each faulty output in the database.
7: if Equation 4.9 is satisfied then
8: record the known key bits
9: increment the known key bit counter by the appropriate value.
10: end if
11: end for
12: end while
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Algorithm 13 Algorithm of Doubling Attack
Input : Access to Algorithm 1, n is the length of secret key k > 0 in non-adjacent
form, Q is the correct result which equals to kP , m is the interval of bits recovering
and is also the acceptable amount of oﬄine work. We precompute half of P and Q
to store them in halfP and halfQ.
Input : k
1: Set C = (n/m) log(2n)
2: Compute Q
3: Compute HP = q+1
2
P
4: Compute HQ = q+1
2
Q
5: Induce c faulty outputs of Alg. 1 applying doubling attack of Q for a random i.
6: Store the collection all Q˜ into C
7: Set s = −1 (s is the starting location to guess)
8: while s < n do
9: Compute L =
∑s
j=0 2
jkjHP
10: for (i=0 ; r¡=m; r++) do
11: for all NAF form of xs+1, xs+2xs+r do
12: Compute Tx = L+
∑s+r
j=s+1 2
jxjHP
13: if Tx− Q˜ = HQ then
14: ks+1 = xs+1, ks+2 = xs+2, . . . , ks+r = xs+r
15: set s = s+ r//s+ r = I; go to line 5
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
19: if no Tx satisfy s = s+ 1 then
20: Go to line 5
21: end if
22: end while
23: Verify Q = KP if = output k else output failure
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4.4.2 Running Time of Algorithm
The algorithm for doubling attack is similar to bit flip attack, except there is an extra
computation on half points. But since it is a one-time operation for the attack. So
the computational complexity is constant. Thus running time of doubling attack will
also be:
T = O(C × n
m
× 2m)
with:
C = (log 1/(2n))/(log(1m/n))
number of faults. The worst case, best case and average case are the same as bit flip
attack.
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5. COUNTER FAULT ATTACK ON WNAF KEY
Observe that the Counter Fault attack has difficulty handling a sequence of consecu-
tive zeros in the key stream. Thus one may attempt to compute the kP using a key
with many consecutive zeros. For example, expressing the key k in NAF or wNAF
form and computing kP . When we are trying to attack the cryptosystem, we are
blind to the value of the key but we are also blind to the form of the key. It could
be in regular binary form, Non-adjacent Form NAF, or even wide-ary Non Adjacent
Form (wNAF). It is well known if a key is in NAF form then the density of the key is
approximating 1/3rd. A key in wNAF form is an even more sparse, here the density
of the wNAF key is 1/(w + 1).
In wNAF, the key is represented using a symbol set of 0 together with non-zero
odd values which are in absolute value less than 2w−1. By definition 2NAF is NAF and
uses the symbols −1, 0, 1. For 3NAF, there are 5 symbols to consider −3,−1, 0, 1, 3.
In general, a key in wNAF form has nonzero symbols, on average, one in every w+ 1
positions. Thus if a counter fault attack is applied in this setting we see the previous
attack may not be successful. Here we address this problem. Taking integer 619 as
an example, the different representations of it are as follows:
Table 5.1: wNAF Forms for 619
binary 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
NAF1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
3NAF 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 3
4NAF 1 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 5
1Here a “-” sign over a digit means negating the digit, eg, 1 denotes -1.
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5.1 Attacking A Cryptographic Computation When the Key is in wNAF
Form
Note the attack on the cryptographic calculation can be conducted on an ECC scalar
multiple, a discrete log calculation (exponentiation), or an RSA signature calculation.
We illustrate this work using a discrete log calculation.
In the case of elliptic curve and discrete log calculations, the keyspace is a prime
field. In the case of RSA the keyspace is Zϕ(N) which is not a field. We now consider
the Counter fault attack, based on King et. al. algorithm, to recreate it, the use of
additional nonzero symbols that occur in wNAF representation is the main emphasis.
In the Counter Fault attack [17], we generate a fault to block line 7 in Algorithm2,
that is the instruction i ← i − 1 is not executed for one iteration. As noted, the
original key has length n so key:
k = kn−1kn−2 · · · ki+1kiki−1 · · · k1k0
becomes, due to this fault:
kˆ = kn−1 · · · ki+1kikiki−1 · · · k1k0.
Since ki is repeated, the higher bits from ki+1 to kn−1 are shifted left by one, and the
lower i bits remain the same. Then the faulty output of a C = M e mod N calculation
will be:
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C˜ = M kˆ
= M (kn−1kn−2···ki+1kiki−1···k1k0)
= M (kn−1kn−2···ki+1ki) · P (kiki−1···k1k0)
= M2Hi(k) ·MLi (k)
= (MHi(k))2 ·M (Li−1(k)+2iki)
= (MHi(k))2 ·M (Li−1(k) ·M2iki
= C ·MHi(k) ·M2iki
= C2 ·M2iki−Li−1(k).
Hence:
C˜ ·MLi(k)−2iki = C2. (5.1)
For example, given a key k = 661, then k can be written in 3NAF as 003000300-3.
Now if a fault occurs at the 2nd bit, then the faulty key:
kˆ will be 00300030003.
Table 5.2: Example of Fault on Zero
k 0 0 -3 0 0 0 3 0 0 -3
kˆ 0 0 -3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 -3
We now consider possible attack scenarios. From Equation 5.1, the faulty output
C˜ is:
C˜ = C2 ·M2iki−Li−1(k).
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Since in this example ki = 0, then:
C˜ = C2 · P−Li−1(k).
Let Gx = M
Li−1(k). Then Gx · C˜ = C2.
Now suppose the fault occurs at some nonzero symbols, such as the 4th bit, then
the faulty key kˆ will be:
Table 5.3: Example of Fault on Nonzero
k 0 0 -3 0 0 0 3 0 0 -3
kˆ 0 0 -3 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 -3
C˜ = C2 ·M2iki−Li−1(k).
Since ki 6= 0, then the approach of the counter fault attack, i.e. check if Gx · C˜ = C2
is no longer valid. Instead, there must be a check Gx ·M−2iki · C˜ = C2. That is, we
need to consider a multiplication on the right hand side of the equation. The counter
fault attack algorithm requires an update concerning the detection.
Thus if one knows the “w” that was used in the wNAF exponentiation and believes
the fault occurred at a ki 6= 0 then one has to check:
C˜ = C2 ·M2ix−Li−1(k), (5.2)
where one has to check for all:
C˜ ∈ database.
and for all:
x ∈ {±1,±3, . . . ,±2w−1 − 1}.
Of course this means they know where the fault occurred, at i, and they know all
keybits below the fault position. Both extremely unlikely, but this observation helps
us derive the attack.
60
      1 0
0-11-0 
States Machine for Simulation of Counter Fault Attack 
Fig. 5.1.: State Machine for Simulation of Counter Fault Attack on no NAF Key
5.2 Algorithm for Counter Fault Attack on RSA with wNAF Key
From the analysis above, we see that the main scheme for determining a fault for a
wNAF key calculation is the same as the original attack on the binary key calculation
except when fault lands on non zeros. In such situations the value Gx needs to be
multiplied by a factor M−2
iki . This is one essential point in the revised algorithm.
Secondly, the symbols that are used are no longer only 0 and 1. While implementing
the line 10 of Algorithm 5.1, we need to consider the symbol with multiple possibilities
using an extra for loop iterating w from −2w−1 + 1 to 2w−1− 1. The state machine in
counter fault attack with regular keys possesses four states: 0 state, 1 state, 01 state,
and 10 state.
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Fig. 5.2.: State Machine for Simulation of Counter Fault Attack on wNAF Key
Now for wNAF representation of keys, the symbols are more varied. For example
in 3-NAF will have “0” state, “1” state, “1” state, “3” state, “3” state, “01” state,
“01” state, “10” state, “10” state, “03” state, “30” state, “03” state, “30” state, which
gives us 13 states in total. There are even more for 4-NAF, etc. So we generalize all
nonzeros in to one object and call it “symbol”. Hence for all wNAF, there are four
states: “0” state, “symbol” state, “0symbol” state, and “symbol0” state. The state
machine and algorithm can be recreated as above:
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Algorithm 14 Counter fault attack on RSA with wNAF Key
input width w, Qˆ,key length n, window size m, P,Q output k
1: Let B ← n
m
log(2n)
2: Create B faulty outputs of Algorithm 2 by inducing a fault on counter i, where i
occurs uniformly random on {0, . . . , n− 1}, so that it prevents a decrementation
3: Let B = {Q˜fj : fj is the jth counter fault of Algorithm 2 with inputs k and P ,
j = 1, . . . , B}
4: Set r ← −1 {here r+ 1 represents the number of least significant bits of k known
by the attacker, initially r + 1 = 0}
5: while r ≤ n−m do
6: Let L ← P
∑r
j=0 kj2
j {here keybits {kj : j < r} of the secret key k are known
by the adversary}
7: for all valid patterns x = xr+ν , . . . , xr+1 (see Definition 2) do
8: Let Gx ← L · P (−2r+νxr+ν+
∑r+ν−1
j=r+1 xj2
j)
9: for all possible symbol of the leading bit, from −2w−1 + 1 to 2w−1 − 1 do
10: for all Q˜ ∈ B do
11: {The following is the verification step and tests if valid pattern x is
correct }
12: Gx ← Gx · P−symbolr+ν
13: if (Gx · Q˜) = Q2 then
14: if r + 1 ≤ 0 then
15: W ← Algorithm 7(x, q, P,Gx, Q˜, Q)
16: if W 6= NIL then
17: output W {Comment: In this case W equals the key k}
18: end if
19: else
20: if xr+ν = 0 then
21: Conclude kr+1 = xr+1, . . . , kr+ν = xr+ν
22: Set r ← r + ν and go to line 5.
23: else
24: Set kr+1 = xr+1 and let r ← r + 1 and go to line 5.
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Algorithm 14 Counter fault attack on RSA with wNAF Key cont’d
25: end if
26: end if
27: end if
28: end for
29: end for
30: end for
31: if no valid pattern satisfies the verification step then
32: Set kr+1 = 0 and let r ← r + 1
33: end if
34: end while
35: if r < n then
36: At this point the adversary knows key bits kr . . . , k1k0 where r > n −m. By
exhaustive search determine kn−1, . . . , kr+1 so that Q = P k.
37: if exhaustive search fails to produce Q = P k then
38: return “failure”
39: end if
40: else
41: if Q 6= P k then
42: return “failure”
43: end if
44: end if
45: output k
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5.3 Uniqueness of the Recovered Bits
An important question, similar to the questions asked in the bit flip attack, for a
given C˜ will the “i” be unique? Suppose for a given faulty output C˜, there exists i
and i′, i 6= i′, such that:
C˜ = C2 ·M2iki−Li−1(k) = C2 ·M2i′k′i−Li′−1(k). (5.3)
This would imply that M2
iki−Li−1(k) = M2
i′ki′−Li′−1(k). As we are working over the
ring ZN this implies the exponent must be equivalent modϕ(N), i.e. 2iki−Li−1(k) =
2i
′
ki′ − Li′−1(k) mod ϕ(N). All equations are expressed modϕ(N).
From above we have:
2iki − 2i′ki′ = Li−1(k)− Li′−1(k). (5.4)
Let’s assume without loss of generality i > i′. We can consider this in four possible
cases.
1. If ki = ki′ = 0, then from Equation 5.4, we can conclude Li−1(k) = Li′−1(k) and
that the two guesses are equivalent, though their length differs;
2. If ki = 0, ki′ 6= 0, then Li′−1(k)− 2i′ki′ = Li−1(k), which means the lower i− 1
bits and lower j − 1 bits have the equal value. Then i = j.
3. If ki 6= 0, ki′ = 0, can prove i = j in the same way as case 2;
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Lower i bits 
Lower i' bits 
ki’+Li-1(k) 
ki+Li’-1(k) 
ki 
Ki’ 
Ki’ 
ki 
4. If ki 6= 0, ki′ 6= 0, since 2iki − 2i′ki′ = Li−1(k)− Li′−1(k), then 2iki + Li′−1(k) =
2i
′
ki′ + Li−1(k).
Assume we have two key streams, the first one is kiki−1 · · · k1k0, another one is
ki′ki′−1 · · · k1k0. The left hand side forms a new key stream, kiki−1 · · · k1k0, which we
represent by a. The right hand side forms another key stream, kiki′−1 · · · k1k0, which
we represent by b. From the equation we can see, a = b, but both the leading bits
ki′ , ki are nonzeros. so a and b must have the same length. Since a and b are just the
lower i bits and i′ bits with leading digit swapped, so the length of lower i bits and i
bits are identical. Hence i = i′. In conclusion, i and i′ are equivalent.
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6. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we designed two novel fault attack: Bit Flip Attack and Doubling
Attack. Also, by implementing King and Wang’s Counter Fault Attack for RSA
cryptosystem we have collected some significant simulations results. Further, we
developed an improvement to the Counter Fault Attack to eliminate an unexpected
faulty bit stream. Lastly we have extended the Counter fault Attack so that it can
attack keys in NAF and wNAF form.
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